In the last several years, the European societies, that in their majority were fairly uniform as far as race, culture or religion, have been converted into intercultural places where many diff erent visions of the world live together. Together with a factor of exogenous plurality, produced by the increase in immigration, an internal desegregation should also be highlighted in our own societies. In this new environment of diversity, it is without a doubt, diffi cult for the Law to accommodate all the diff erent ethical, religious or cultural demands of the people. In my paper I study the means of accommodation rooted in our legal tradition such as: the conscientious objection, the agreements of the State with religious groups, mediation and arbitration as a way of accommodation of plurality in the fi eld of Family Law, etc. I conclude by stressing the fact that allowing space for diversity does not mean giving up our own values. Quite the opposite, accommodation comes from our own values: that is, from the respect for freedom and non-discrimination, founded on the dignity of the person.
Church, Muslims of distinct tendencies, protestants, Jehovah witnesses, etc. Th is is a rather new situation in our countries 1 .
In this current environment of diversity, it is diffi cult for the Law to accommodate all the diff erent ethical, religious or cultural demands of the people, especially due to the lack of fl exibility in the Civil Law or Continental-Law countries (to a lesser extent in the Common-Law countries, which enjoy a rather fl exible system).
Th us, we fi nd ourselves with a double confl ict: a) On the one hand, the confl icts of individual convictions colliding with the legal system. Th is is what happens with conscientious objection.
In just a few years, we have gone from the almost-exclusive prominence of the objection to military service, to the proliferation of objections in diff erent areas: in the health arena (objection to abortion, artifi cial reproduction…), objection to medical treatments or blood transfusions, objections in the labor fi eld (for example, to work on certain holidays), etc. 2 Recently, in Spain, two new types of objections have been proposed: the objection of judges to the celebration of marriage between people of the same sex and the objection of some parents to their children receiving the new subject: "civic education", due to it contents. b) On the other hand, together with the confl ict of the people who reject the legislation as contrary to their own value system, due to immigration we fi nd ourselves with confl icts arisen from the penetration in the Law of foreign cultural-religious elements, with the consequent "perplexity" of the Law.
Th is is what happens, for example, with some Islamic matrimonial institutions such as polygamy, unfamiliar to our legal tradition and values. Th e Western European legal systems do not recognize polygamous marriage because of domestic public policy. However, despite the direct rejection, the Law is forced to give some indirect eff ects to polygamy 3 . Th is happens, for example, when the several wives of a polygamist immigrant, legally married to him in their country of origin, claim a widow's pension in their host country. In these cases, the Spanish courts have agreed to divide the pension among the wives, assigning equal parts to each of them (regardless of the amount of time spent living with the husband), therefore giving indirect recognition to polygamy 4 . Another example of indirect recognition is produced when the polygamist immigrant tries to regroup with his diff erent wives 5 . He is only allowed to regroup with one of them, not necessarily the fi rst one; he can regroup as spouse with the second, the third or the fourth wife and the choice is up to the husband. So, it is also an indirect recognition to polygamy.
Th us, as a consequence of the plurality of our new social horizon in Western Europe, we require to move towards a more fl exible Law in order to accommodate the diversity.
Before referring to the possible tools of accommodation I shall briefl y mention the theories contrary to accommodation.
II. An alternative between "secular absolutism" and "mosaic societies" to accommodate the plurality of society.
Opposed to the need of moving towards fl exibility is the so-called "secular absolutism"
6 . In this approach, the myth of the neutrality of secular law and the privacy of convictions survive. According to this view, beliefs should remain in the private arena (the home, the conscience, the temple), because when they invade public life, they disturb social peace and cohabitation. A clear example of this consideration is the polemic French law that prohibits the Islamic headscarf or other religious signs in public schools 7 . Th e philosophy underlying is that religion should not be present in school. Th e notion of secularity that proposes turning religion into a "bubble religion", that is not present in (that does not contaminate) society, ties in with an ancient opinion that springs from the French Revolution in 1789 and that historically had its raison d'être in Europe, and was possibly even necessary. But, in the XXI century, if the secular State is not at the service of people's freedom to profess their religion; if, in the name of secularity, freedom is banned, then an abuse is being committed that in my opinion, cannot be justifi ed and jeopardizes democracy and the progress on which it is frequently based. Th at is, what was a step forwards in the XIX century, is a step backwards in the XXI century.
Opposite to assimilationism we have the so-called "mosaic societies" in which diff erent cultures coexist, without mixing with one another: that is to say that cultural ghettos are created made up of foreigners who do not know the language, who do not attend the same schools, who do not go to the same shops, and who do not establish relationships with people from their adoptive country.
Th e alternative to both extremes would be that of a single intercultural society: common, yet plural, with shared basic values, but one in which there is room for everyone. Th is intercultural-ness would suppose: a) on the one hand, the acceptance of certain common principles and values that would be defi ned by the dignity of the person and respect for human rights 8 ; b) but, on the other hand, along with the acceptance of certain common principles, respect for plurality.
I shall now refer to some tools rooted in our legal tradition that we can use to make the Law more fl exible in order to accommodate plurality. Th is is what is clearly stated in a law that came into eff ect in Spain a few years ago with the purpose of fostering the social integration of immigrants. Between several reforms it typifi es genital mutilation as a separate crime on the basis that (I read the introduction of the Law) it is "a practice that must be fought against with all the force possible, without any possible justifi cation on the basis of so-called religious or cultural grounds".
III. Means of accommodation rooted to our legal tradition.

From the "conscientious objection" to the legally protected "conscientious option".
A way to avoid the confl icts between Law and convictions would be to convert the foreseeable conscientious objections in legally protected options when the ethical rejection of certain sectors of society is expected, as is the case of laws approved aft er an important social controversy. Th at is the case in Spain, for example, regarding same-sex marriage law 9 .
It would mean the inclusion of a conscientious clause in the controversial regulation. Th e advantage of this process is that it does not place the objector in opposition to the system, but within it.
Spain stated this, by constitutional imperative, for the objection to military service. On the other hand, almost all the Western European laws legalizing abortion include a conscientious clause for the health personnel 10 . In Spain, when the jury law was passed, there was an amendment (that eventually did not prosper) to include the conscientious objection within the excuses to act as jury 11 .
So, to convert conscientious objections into a legal option would be a way to accommodate plurality within the Law.
Th e agreements of the State with religious groups as a means of accommodation.
Another possible tool to accommodate the Law to the demands of conscience are the Agreements of the State with religious communities.
We have this system of Cooperation Agreements for example in Spain, Germany and Italy.
In Spain, bilateral instruments to regulate matters of common interest between Church and State have used since the eighteenth century, but exclusively to defi ne the legal status of the Catholic Church. Th ese were the Concordats, an ancient institution with a legal nature analogous to that of international treaties. Th e Concordat with the Catholic Church that is currently in eff ect in Spain dates from [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] Th e Agreements are, without any doubt, an appropriate instrument to the accommodation of religious diversity. In this way, the Agreements recognize civil validity of marriage administered in accordance with the Canon law or with the Islamic, Jewish or Evangelical ceremony. Th ey recognize the communities the possibility of teaching their religion in state schools when students ask for it; and if there are at least ten students in each class, the teacher is paid by the State. In the agreements with the Jews and Muslims, the public powers commit themselves to protecting, in terms of food products, the denomination halal (for the Muslims) and kosher (for the Jews). If the communities register these denominations in the Patent and Trademark Offi ce, it is guaranteed that the products that carry the denomination will be produced in accordance with the respective religious laws. Th is order is not stipulated for Christians, who have no religious dietary laws. In matters of religious holidays, the Agreements establish In short, the Agreements are an appropriate instrument to effi ciently resolve the confl icts that religious communities can provoke in the adaptation of their religious precepts to the general demands of legislation. Nonetheless we are not taking all the advantages that the Agreements are able to provide us. the expulsion from our country of the religious minorities , possibly with more political than legal intention. And I think that it is proper for the Law to answer to social demands but not to anticipate them as it occurred with the 1992 Agreements.
In this way, the Spanish Agreement with the Islamic Commission was signed at a time when the cooperation with Islam still did not present problems in Spain. When they began, upon the notable increase of the Muslim presence in Spain as a consequence of immigration, the solutions that the Agreement off ered were extremely vague and insuffi cient. With the 1992 Agreement, a representative organism for Islam was also established in our country, absolutely artifi cial, that is not representative of Islam in Spain and that is paralyzing the effi cient application of the Agreement. Th is has occurred because, in order to sign the Agreement, the State requested the two existing federations of Islamic communities to unite in a single one (the Islamic Commission of Spain). Th e problem is that between the two Islamic federations there are important diff erences and rivalry. As they cannot agree between themselves, it is oft en diffi cult to apply the cooperation agreement signed with the State 14 .
Let me illustrate this with an example -for the civil validity of Islamic weddings in Spain, the consent of the parties shall be lent in the presence of two witnesses, who must be of age and one Islamic religious leader or Imam accredited by the Islamic Commission of Spain. We have been celebrating Islamic weddings with civil eff ects in spite of not having any religious leader or Imam accredited by the ICS. What would happen if the civil validity of these marriages were challenge? I don't know, it has not occurred till the moment. Another example: to be able to teach Islamic education in Spanish public schools the Islamic Commission of Spain must present to the Administration, so that it can approve it, a list of teachers of religion. However, the two Islamic Groups that constitute the Commission cannot agree on a list of teachers, and in some Spanish cities this Islamic education is not yet being imparted for this reason.
In any case, despite its defi ciencies, the truth is that the Agreements with religious communities have provided tools for the accommodation of the Law. In the area of Family law, a legal resource that is being used in our countries to adapt to the diff erent cultural identities is the institution of mediation and arbitration. It makes it easier for the parties involved to resolve their confl icts in compliance with a law that is more close to them.
Furthermore, the alternative dispute resolution procedures contribute to lighten the court system load, to reduce the costs of the process, to avoid the publicity of subjects that parties want to keep private and to obtain a quick decision that prevents a greater exacerbation of the matrimonial confl ict.
Mediation and arbitration also help to avoid the civil courts from the obligation to declare with reference to institutions with which they are not familiarized. In this way, there have even been cases in which the civil courts have interpreted religious Law. Allow me to cite a curious example from a California Court. Th e disagreement between the diff erent experts called to testify before the Court, has forced the American Court to take part in the interpretation of the Islamic law when it shouldn't because it has neither the qualifi cations nor the competence to do it. Th e Court had to decide whether a Muslim woman loses her right to the dower or not when she is the one asking for a divorce. Particularly shocking is the following affi rmation in which the American Court dares to refer to the wisdom of the Prophet. However, despite the advantages, the submission of the confl icts of family Law to arbitration (and specifi cally religious arbitration) is not exempt from diffi culties. Allow me to illustrate the problem with the example of Canada.
In Canada, the system in force in Ontario from 1991 to 2005, allowed arbitration to resolve certain family matters and, in fact, some religious communities had their own arbitration courts under the protection of this regulation. However, the creation of the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice at the end of 2003 that was created in order to allow Canadian Muslims to resolve their confl icts according to Islamic Law sparked an intense debate in the country. Among the group that rejected the Islamic arbitration were some sectors of the Canadian Muslim population, such as the Canadian Council of Muslim Women that played a fundamental role.
Th e reasons given to object were that there is not just one but several interpretations of the Islamic Law and that some of them are of patriarchal inspiration, harmful to women's equality.
Th e answer to this was that arbitration is voluntary and requires the consent of both parties. However, it was said that some women could feel obligated to attend these Islamic courts, in virtue of their religious convictions or under family and community pressure. Th is was one of the main reasons for the govern- Despite the unquestionable advantages of religious mediation and arbitration, it seems advisable to promote a gradual and prudent implementation, may be starting with mediation that allows judicial revision 17 .
IV. Conclusion
To conclude, Western European legal systems are being claimed to accommodate a new social reality that is eminently plural. In my paper, I have pointed out some tools directed to this purpose.
I conclude by stressing the fact that allowing space for diversity does not mean, as some European people believe and fear, giving up our own values. Quite the opposite, accommodation comes from our own values: that is, from the respect for freedom and non-discrimination, founded on the dignity of the person.
16 Family Statute Law Amendment Act, introduced on November 15, 2005. 17 While the religious communities are not in a place to off er guarantees for an application of these means that is adequate in their idiosyncrasy but also compatible with the values and fundamental rights of our legislation.
